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Abstract 
In this paper we contribute to knowledge of power and politics in international business by 
developing the understanding of the role of discourse and sensemaking in the subsidiary-
headquarters relationship, based on an ethnographic action research study in a British 
subsidiary of an American Multinational Corporation. First, we conduct a discourse analysis 
of the accounts, stories and metaphors through which power and politics in the subsidiary-
headquarters relationship were created as social facts. Next, we trace longitudinally how these 
facts led the subsidiary managers to hide, dilute or restrict their ‘local sense’ from the 
headquarters, including their knowledge of the local market and their preferred strategic 
direction for the firm: a process we term sense-censoring. We reveal how the subsidiary 
managers used power and politics as reasoning procedures to decide against pursuing a 
preferred course of action, despite a strongly held belief to the contrary, due to anticipated 
reactions or counter-actions. In so doing, potential strategic action was transformed into 
inaction. We conclude by outlining the implications of systems of sense-censoring and strategic 
inaction for the management of global-local relations in multinational corporations. 
 
Keywords: Discourse, Multinational corporations, Politics, Power, Sensemaking, Sense-
censoring, Strategic inaction.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Why do subsidiaries in Multinational Corporations (MNCs) fail to voice their opinions, fail to 
resist seemingly misplaced central policies and fail to share their local knowledge with 
headquarters? Answering these questions can help us to understand some of the central issues 
in international business, such as how resources are allocated, how information is shared, and 
how control can be exerted over subsidiary operations spanning geographical, product or 
market boundaries (Prahalad and Doz, 1981; Doz and Prahalad, 1984; Mudambi and Navarra, 
2004; Andersson et al., 2007; Mudambi, 2011; Meyer et al., 2011). Following Dörrenbächer 
and Geppert (2006) and Clark and Geppert (2011), our focus is on intra-organizational 
sensemaking about power and politics within the MNC rather than the effects of the macro-
political sphere on the MNC, such as the effects of the political hostility of host country regimes 
on Foreign Direct Investment (as for example in Hymer, 1979: Part III). The paper presents 
findings from a longitudinal ethnographic action research study of a change initiative within 
the British subsidiary of an American-owned MNC. Our study provides two main 
contributions. First, we develop a discursive enactment perspective that reveals the role of 
discourse – in particular accounts, stories and metaphors – in the reproduction and/or 
transformation of subsidiary managers’ ‘framing’ (Creed, Langstraat and Scully, 2002; Fiss 
and Hirsch, 2005; Fairhurst, 2010) of global-local power and politics. Second, we show how 
this dominant framing led the subsidiary to hide, dilute or restrict their local sensemaking from 
the global headquarters – a process we call ‘sense-censoring’ – thereby transforming potential 
strategic change into strategic inaction. 
Adding to the existing body of sensemaking-related constructs (see Maitlis and 
Christianson, 2014: 68), we define sense-censoring as the process through which actors 
consciously ‘censor’ their sensemaking accounts, with or without the presence of any official 
attempts to edit or silence them, due to anticipated reactions or counter-actions. This concept 
is therefore different from the term “sense-hiding”, which is defined as the actions of those in 
authority in “hiding particular ideas” (Vaara and Monin, 2010: 6), “silencing alternative 
senses” and the “marginalization of particular voices” (Monin et al., 2013: 262) – a term closer 
to the notion of authority-imposed censorship. It is also related to but distinct from Weber’s 
notion of ‘legitimate authority’1, but could nonetheless be seen as a social processes through 
                                                          
1 “Under bureaucratic domination the enacted norm establishes that the person in power has legitimate authority 
to issue a specific ruling.” (Weber, 1978: 1006) 
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which the ‘lower rungs’ prospectively anticipate the ‘rulings’ of the upper echelons – even 
where they disagree with those rulings themselves. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we review existing work on power and politics 
in MNCs. In the next two sections, we outline the discursive enactment perspective on power 
and politics we adopt in this paper, with its emphasis on the role of discourse in sensemaking. 
After outlining the methodology of the study upon which we draw, we present the empirical 
data in two sections: a detailed analysis of team meeting interaction followed by a longitudinal 
analysis of a series of global-local issues. Finally, we conclude by discussing the contribution 
of the notions of discursive enactment and sense-censoring to the wider understanding of power 
and politics in MNCs. 
 
POWER AND POLITICS IN MNCS 
 
Traditionally, power has been something of a ‘taboo’ subject in business and management 
studies, a kind of “éminence grise” (Krause-Jensen, 2010: 69). More recently, however, 
scholars have shifted towards “a notion of power that does not automatically identify power 
with something oppressive and noxious” (Krause-Jensen, 2010: 70), by viewing power and 
politics more as a potentially productive element of organizational life (Buchanan and Badham, 
1999; Kacmar et al., 1999; Butcher and Clarke 2003; Gunn and Chen, 2006; Pfeffer, 2010; 
Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2011). A similar trend has been seen in the international business 
literature. In their study of HQ-subsidiary relations, Schotter and Beamish (2011: 254) 
emphasised “that power and political game playing are unavoidable components of 
organizational life”. 
By the mid-1990s, from an HRM/IR perspective, the headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship was analysed in political, reward-and-punish terms (Ferner and Edwards, 1995; 
Mueller, 1996). In the 2000s, this was taken further into a more clearly defined ‘power and 
politics’ school of thought, which conceived of the MNC as constituted by a “set of relations 
between a range of actors with their own powers and interests” (Morgan, 2001: 9-10). 
Mudambi (2011) and Blazejewski and Becker-Ritterspach (2011: 142-4) both distinguish a 
number of different theoretical approaches to the study of headquarter-subsidiary relations in 
MNCs. Specifically, Mudambi (2011) distinguishes the headquarters-subsidiary dyad; the 
evolution of subsidiary mandates; and the multiple embeddedness of the MNC perspectives. In 
terms of the broader theoretical traditions, research into MNCs has been dominated by 
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transaction cost economics, resource dependency and institutional schools of thought (Ghoshal 
and Westney. 2003; Rugman, 2005), with an additional perspective provided by radical neo-
Marxian scholarship (e.g. Hymer, 1979) and critical management perspectives (e.g. Willmott, 
2013).  
The MNC is thus seen as involving “often lively and dynamic political activities of 
actors, making the MNC a ‘contested terrain’” (Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2011: 22; Edwards 
and Bélanger, 2009), where “problems of nationalism and problems of authoritarianism 
intertwine” (Hymer, 1979: 48). Power can be exerted in decisive and dramatic ways, for 
example, when a subsidiary is sold, liquidated or its major operations outsourced. However, 
such options can be threatened or anticipated rather than actually exercised. Indeed, the 
power/politics perspective deviated more mainstream strategy and economics-based 
approaches by showing that rules and relationships are continuously contested (Hymer, 1979: 
48-50; Hardy and Clegg, 1996: 334; Ferner, 2000; Geppert and Dörrenbächer, 2011: 26). 
Factors influencing the power balance and political dynamics are numerous, and include: the 
combination of market size, planning experience and revenue-generating potential 
(Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009), strategic centrality, control over administrative systems 
and the maintenance of a dominant coalition (Jarzabkowski and Wilson, 2002), size or prestige 
(Bousseba et al., 2012), and the distribution of resources, organizational culture and the 
centralization or decentralization of control (Balogun and Johnson, 2004). Mudambi (2011: 
Figure 2) characterizes the headquarters – subsidiary relationship in terms of two dimensions, 
‘headquarters control’ and ‘subsidiary response to headquarters control’, whereby the latter can 
either be ‘acquiescence’ or ‘resistance’.  
As Schotter and Beamish (2011: 247) show, “subsidiary resistance is a far more 
common phenomenon than previously acknowledged” and, in some circumstances, rejection 
of HQ initiatives can have positive outcomes for the subsidiary, depending on the nature of its 
boundary-spanning function with HQ. Yamin and Ghauri (2010: 134) distinguish ‘invisible 
networks’ around subsidiaries from ‘visible networks’ controlled by the centre, showing that a 
shift towards the latter as part of a planned outsourcing strategy can shift “the balance of power 
in favour of control and planning by the MNC centre”. Hence, work has begun to examine 
power and politics as an outcome of the ongoing sensemaking, interactions and negotiations 
between social actors. In the next section, we elaborate in more detail the sensemaking 
perspective on MNCs we draw upon and seek to contribute to.  
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SENSEMAKING AND MNC POWER AND POLITICS 
 
In the field of international business, power is no longer understood as a ‘one way street’ – 
something possessed by the global headquarters and exercised over subsidiaries – but rather as 
a dynamic and situational achievement mediated by processes of sensemaking and discourse 
(see e.g. Clark and Geppert, 2011, Balogun et al., 2011). This means that we must view “macro 
structures such as the global market, the national business system or local work practices [as] 
socially constructed in micro situations, often in the form of commitments and justifications” 
(Geppert, 2003: 314). It is through the stories, texts and conversations that circulate within 
MNCs that actors make sense of the resources, knowledge, capabilities, alliances and 
bargaining power that subsidiaries have, or may lay claim to. Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005: 
175) describe the way in which a reorganization exercise led by the parent headquarters 
affected the distribution of power in the MNC they studied. Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008a,b) 
outline the various tactics used by subsidiaries to gain attention from global headquarters, 
including how subsidiaries with apparently ‘low power’ gain influence despite their lack of 
control of formal resources. As Williams (2011: 287) shows, “politics can be used by 
subsidiary managers within the MNC as a way to provide impetus for initiative and competence 
development, attract resources and new mandates”. Indeed, Balogun et al. (2011) show how 
voice and resistance is enacted by subsidiaries in order to actively reconfigure their role within 
the MNC. 
Processes of sensemaking and sensegiving are important for how ‘power’ is understood 
and how ‘political’ agendas or motives are established. Actors have to make sense of who has 
power, how it is produced and how best to enact it. They also have to make sense of ‘political’ 
action by negotiating distinctions between who is acting in the interests of the organization or 
in their own sectional political interests to advance their agenda or protect their “turf”. For 
example, HQ managers must establish whether a particular subsidiary action – such as a request 
for resources or a decision to withhold certain information – is motivated by a ‘legitimate’ or 
‘illegitimate’ agenda. Sensemaking must also be directed toward establishing whether they 
have sufficient power and influence to enforce control over a ‘rebellious’ or ‘resistant’ 
subsidiary, and also through what methods to exert such control (Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 
2006; Meyer et al., 2011; Mudambi, 2011; Clark and Geppert, 2011; Schotter & Beamish, 
2011).  
Becker-Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer (2011) propose that understanding the 
behavioural rationales that underpin subsidiary behaviour is important for understanding MNC 
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behaviour, such as intra-firm competition between SBUs. Their study reveals the existence of 
distinct ‘actor rationales’ within MNCs, as different subsidiaries attempt to make sense of when 
competition is preferred over cooperation, for instance. Recent studies have also highlighted 
how actors within both the headquarters and subsidiary make sense of factors such as control 
systems, resource allocation and information sharing (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Chini, Ambos 
and Wehle, 2005). For example, both Birkinshaw et al. (2000) and Clark and Geppert (2011: 
411) uncovered significant perception gaps between the subsidiary managers and headquarters 
in terms of how the former estimated aspects such as their strategic value and role, leading to 
significant ‘disjunctures’ in their thinking and behaviour. For us, what matters, then, is not 
what ‘power bases’ or ‘political bargaining tools’ (resources, markets, innovations, knowledge, 
etc.) subsidiaries technically have, or what power plays or political threats actually emanate 
from the global headquarters. Rather, what counts is how the subsidiary makes sense of what 
they have, and what actions they might take, and what they perceive are the likely consequences 
of any such actions by the global company they are part of. Importantly, this can occur even 
before any reactions and counter-actions have actually taken place. In fact, as we will go on to 
show in this paper, sense-censoring can operate prospectively to make sense of why an action 
should not be undertaken and why sensemaking needs to be ‘censored’ in the absence of any 
official organizational attempts to censor subsidiary activities. 
Clark and Geppert (2011: 405) also contribute to the MNC sensemaking approach by 
distinguishing four types of identity sensemaking: dominated, oppositional, defensive, and 
consensual. How headquarters and subsidiary respectively make sense of their identity is 
interactive in that “(l)ocal managers’ responses are likely to be tempered by the head office 
managers’ political stance. When sensegiving acts are perceived as coercive or dominating, for 
example, local managers may adopt defensive tactics that vary from opposition to ceremonial 
acceptance …” (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 405). This ceremonial acceptance can hide a deeper 
disquiet which might live as ‘silent dissatisfaction’, but – as we seek to show - can also find 
expression in what we call ‘sense-censoring’. Mudambi and Navarra (2004: 386) posit that “an 
important subsidiary objective is its bargaining power within the firm.” From a ‘political 
sensemaking’ perspective, “the MNE is conceptualized as the ongoing social construction of 
dispersed social actors applying different ‘contextual rationalities’ to influence the strategic 
meaning of the subsidiary” (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 397). This leads us to examine how and 
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why different forms of ‘rationality’ – or different ‘thought worlds’ to use Baunsgaard and 
Clegg’s (2013) terminology – exist within various global divisions of international businesses2. 
Whilst existing studies have contributed greatly to our understanding of power and 
politics in MNCs, what these studies have paid less attention to is how these social facts about 
power and politics are discursively constructed through the production of accounts in real-life 
work situations (Paroutis and Heracleous, 2013) and how these accounts are used by members 
in real-time encounters to base their decision-making and action on (Balogun, et al., 2011). For 
instance, we do not know if the accounts of power and politics produced in the diaries and 
interviews collected by Balogun and Johnson (2004, 2005), Kristensen and Zeitlin (2005) or 
Bousseba et al. (2012) were also used in their daily working lives, and if so, how they were 
responded or reacted to in specific interactional contexts. In short, what is missing is an 
understanding of how organizational members in MNCs use power and politics in their 
everyday working lives as they go about their practical tasks. Studying these everyday 
situations where ‘power’ and ‘politics’ get created as social facts and used as practical 
reasoning procedures is important, in our view, because it is these situations that have material 
consequences for ‘what happens next’, as “only members’ accounts are implicated in the 
constitution of actual courses of action” (Llewellyn and Spence, 2009: 1434). The question 
remaining, therefore, is precisely how organizational members go about “negotiating and 
constructing the organization as a reality independent of its particular members but with 
determining power over their activities” (Gephart, 1978: 560).  
 
DISCOURSE AND MNC POWER AND POLITICS 
What, then, is the role of discourse in MNC sensemaking processes? We draw on, and further 
develop, Balogun et al.’s (2011) discursive perspective that emphasises the “constitutive role 
of language” by elucidating the “complex ways in which discourse is used to socially construct 
the MNE and the role of the subsidiary” (p. 766). It is through the production, circulation and 
interpretation of accounts (Maitlis, 2005) that members learn to make sense of their internal 
and external environment, as people share, compare, and negotiate their accounts of ‘what is 
going on here’ and ‘what should we do next’ (Maitlis, 2005; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007; 
Balogun et al., 2011). Hence, we focus primarily on sensegiving rather than sensemaking per 
                                                          
2 The emphasis on different forms or “modes” of rationality is also advanced by Baunsgaard and Clegg (2013), 
who examine the different ideological modes of rationality arising from systems of professional training and 
socialisation. 
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se, the former defined by Gioia and Chittipedi (1991: 442) as “attempting to influence the 
sensemaking and meaning construction of others toward a preferred redefinition of 
organizational reality”.  
In order to analyse the multiple relationships involved in MNCs, Meyer et al. (2011: 
236) suggest the term “increasing interfaces” and argue that “subsidiaries must be ‘externally 
embedded’ within each local context while also being sufficiently ‘internally embedded’ within 
the MNE network”, and as a result we should think of subsidiaries as being multiply embedded. 
In this paper, we seek to advance understanding of these ‘contextual rationalities’ (Clark and 
Geppert, 2011) or ‘thought worlds’ (Baunsgaard and Clegg, 2013) in multiply embedded 
subsidiary relationships by examining how the discursive construction of particular ‘facts’ 
about power and politics led to forms of ‘reasoning’ that made apparently ‘irrational’ decisions 
– strategic inaction and sense-censoring – seem ‘rational’. What is needed, we suggest, is a 
framework for understanding the role of discourse in creating the ‘social facts’ upon which 
managerial reasoning, decision-making and action is founded. To this end, we seek to develop 
a discursive enactment perspective, which provides a framework for understanding how the 
power environment and political terrain in MNCs are constructed as social facts and used to 
conduct practical business in ‘live’ situations.    
We build on Balogun et al.’s (2011) discursive perspective on subsidiary-headquarters 
relationships by examining how making sense of an actor, say global HQ, as ‘powerful’ or 
‘political’ makes a difference to the practical decisions and actions of members. In so doing, 
we are able to address two important questions about subsidiary behaviour in MNCs, namely: 
How does discourse shape sensemaking about MNC power and politics? And most 
importantly, what outcomes flow from specific instances of such sensemaking?  
 
METHODOLOGY 
According to Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2011: 235), recent research has made only 
limited progress in “mapping the detailed inner working of MNCs”. Research on organizational 
and strategic change in an MNC context typically relies on interviews (Rouleau and Balogun, 
2011; Bousseba et al., 2012; Jarzabkowski and Balogun, 2009; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005; 
Balogun and Johnson, 2004), giving rise to problems of hindsight, post-hoc and retrospective 
rationalisation (see Schotter & Beamish, 2011: 247). Part of the methodological challenge 
facing the field is the need for methodologies which enable research to study at a micro-level 
detail of situated (inter-)action, while also being able to capture the more meso- and macro-
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction 
 10 
level processes which unfold over time over a larger scale and scope (Pettigrew et al., 2001: 
697). For Blazejewski and Becker-Ritterspach (2011: 180), a process perspective is necessary 
to capture the dynamics of headquarters-subsidiary relations in MNCs. Ethnography enables 
us to capture the ‘temporal flow of practice’ as it happens in ‘real time’ and in situ (Maitlis and 
Lawrence, 2003; Moeran, 2009; Sandberg and Tsoukas, 2011). We respond to Dörrenbächer 
and Gammelgaard’s (2011: 249) call for more “in-depth ethnographic and socio-political 
studies” as ethnography in MNCs can draw on insights garnered by related disciplines such as 
anthropology (e.g. Mazzarella, 2003; Wright, 1994). 
 
The case study setting 
The study upon which this paper draws comprised 30 months of participant observation, 
conducted by two action researchers, of a change initiative in a UK subsidiary of ‘FitCo’ (all 
names are pseudonyms), a US-headquartered MNC. FitCo is a major player in the worldwide 
branded apparel market, operating in more than 25 countries, with a global turnover of more 
than $3bn3. The firm sells a wide range of branded goods to consumers, predominantly through 
major retail chains rather than its own outlets. Most of the local national operations were wholly 
owned subsidiary companies managed by national managing directors reporting directly to 
headquarters, with very few joint ventures and licensed distribution operations.  
 FitCo[UK] had a turnover of over $300m and was FitCo's largest profit centre outside 
of the US. Moreover, because the company was originally founded in Britain, the UK 
subsidiary was also of great cultural importance to the strategic narrative and ‘rhetorical 
history’ of the firm (Suddaby, et al., 2010). On paper, FitCo[UK] had the strategic position, 
economic performance and local country embeddedness that should have rendered them a 
powerful player within the framework of Geppert and Williams (2006). FitCo’s British 
founders grew the firm rapidly in its early years, exploiting a combination of product 
innovation, elegant branding and fast adaptation to changing market trends. Exports grew fast 
and so did the company's visibility; leading a major US concern to buy the business and build 
the now well-known major multinational multi-brand corporation. Under the new American 
owners, product lines, design, marketing advertising, sales targets and budgets were set 
centrally by the US headquarters. Strategy, R&D, product design and marketing were all 
centralized, leading most subsidiaries – the UK included – to have a limited claim to a 
“competence-creating mandate” (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005: 1109). The emphasis on 
                                                          
3  Figures correct at the time of the study. 
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centralized control and short-term financial performance criteria was akin to the “strategic 
dependant” view of subsidiaries described by Clark and Geppert (2011).  
 
Data collection 
The study was conducted by two academic researchers, who were invited into the company to 
act as ‘action researchers’ to provide their (unremunerated) assistance in a FitCo[UK] strategic 
change initiative, in return for being permitted to collect data for academic purposes. The 
inevitable corollary to in-depth immersion in one site, of course, is that the researchers were 
unable to be simultaneously present in other locations. Hence, the study does not have access 
to the inner workings of the global headquarters or other subsidiaries. However, the study does 
illuminate how the subsidiary managers anticipated how global headquarters would respond, 
hence our focus on “sensemaking about the likely sensemaking of others” (see also Clark and 
Geppert, 2011). The data-set was later shared with a wider team of scholars to enable new 
insights to be generated, subject to the same confidentiality agreement. The research was 
conducted in three phases, outlined in Table 1.  
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
In Phase 1, Researcher 1 was invited into the UK subsidiary to act as an unpaid 
Management Consultant (MC) to lead a strategic change initiative concerning key account 
management (KAM). Phase 1 involved six months of semi-structured interviews with senior 
management and other relevant parties, work shadowing, the collection of relevant documents 
and information, and participant observation of formal and informal settings. The aim of Phase 
1 was to produce a ‘diagnosis’ of the subsidiary’s KAM problems, along with a set of 
recommendations about how they should be addressed. This ‘diagnosis’ and ‘action plan’ was 
subsequently accepted and ratified by the UK Board of Directors. 
In Phase 2, Researcher 1 began implementing his recommendations. He assembled a 
project team of senior managers (hereafter the ‘project team’) and hired another ‘action 
researcher’ (Researcher 2) – a doctoral researcher jointly funded by the company, also with 
significant industry experience – to assist with the implementation work. Researchers 1 and 2 
worked jointly with the project team for several months, before Researcher 1 exited the field, 
having been in the field for a total of 18 months. Data collection during Phase 2 comprised of 
field-notes recorded by the two researchers of all their interactions, along with tape-recordings 
of all the project team meetings. Finally, Phase 3 consisted of further field-notes, tape 
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction 
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recordings and document capture by Researcher 2 for a subsequent 12 months, as the 
implementation of the new KAM strategy unfolded. Repeat interviews were also conducted 
with all members of the project team throughout the change implementation.  
The data is presented in this paper in two inter-related parts. In the first part, excerpts 
from the tape-recording of the first project team meeting from Phase 2 are subjected to a 
detailed ethnomethodologically-informed discourse analysis (Bolander and Sandberg, 2013; 
Whittle et al, 2014). The analysis focused in particular on how the accounts, stories and 
metaphors produced during a dialogue between Researcher 1 and a senior manager discursively 
enacted power and politics as social facts. The second part broadens the analytic scope to 
provide a longitudinal analysis of a series of issues – and associated organizational outcomes - 
in the subsequent months of the subsidiary change initiative traced by the study. This second 
section draws on three main data sources from Phases 2 and 3: ethnographic field-notes, tape-
recorded meetings and semi-structured interviews. Our approach therefore follows both the 
classic early work of Moerman (1988) and more recent contributions to organization studies of 
Samra-Fredericks (2003) and Hughes et al (2012) in seeking to combine detailed analysis of 
the interactional features of talk-in-interaction, along with broader ethnographic observations 
of unfolding courses of action over time and space.  
 
Data analysis 
Data analysis proceeded in two stages. First, transcripts were created of the ten project team 
meetings and a detailed discourse analysis was conducted of these transcripts. The basic unit 
of analysis was an individual ‘account’, which can take many forms, such as ‘factual 
descriptions’ or ‘stories’ (Antaki, 1994; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). Accounts 
typically involve the use of particular descriptions, narrative sequences of events, phrases, 
terms, figures of speech and metaphors (Potter and Wetherell, 1987). Two of these elements – 
stories and metaphors – were particularly prominent in the data analysis of the transcripts and 
hence comprise a central focus of this paper.  
The data excerpt analysed in this paper was one of the relatively rare moments where 
the relationship between parent and subsidiary was explicitly ‘topicalized’ (Edwards and 
Potter, 1992), i.e. became a ‘topic’ of conversation. As our analysis will show, most of the time 
the sense of ‘power imbalance’ and ‘political tension’ between the subsidiary and headquarters 
was not explicitly discussed. The extract we analyse is therefore not presented as a ‘typical’ or 
‘representative’ excerpt designed to illustrate a wider set of such instances. Rather, the aim was 
to focus on a particularly rare and ‘pivotal’ moment where a working ‘definition of the 
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situation’ (Goffman, 1959/71: 246; Thomas, 2002) of the internal MNC parent-subsidiary 
relationship was explicitly discussed in a meeting. 
Having identified the ‘pivotal moment’ of discursive enactment in the first team 
meeting, the second stage of data analysis involved a broader analysis of the whole 
ethnographic study to examine how this enactment shaped the team’s decision-making and 
action over time and across different contexts. The seven issues presented in this paper are 
what the participants in their first-order sensemaking, not us as analysts, saw as being affected 
by (or affecting) their relationship to the global HQ. We present the ethnographic findings in 
three formats to aid conceptualisation: not only as a narrative but also diagrammatically as a 
timeline (see Figure 1 below) and with a table detailing the issues (see Table 4 below). 
 
 
THE DISCURSIVE ENACTMENT OF POWER AND POLITICS 
 
The first meeting of the project team began with the management consultant ‘MC’ (Researcher 
1) presenting his ‘diagnosis’ of the problems the company faced - both locally and globally - 
and the changes he thought were required to ‘fix’ them. Within the first hour of the meeting, 
the group established that they needed a new key account strategy and a more cross-functional 
way of working. Their retail customers were hugely important: the company did not have its 
own stores and therefore relied exclusively on these retailers to sell their products to consumers. 
For FitCo at least, their new way of managing key accounts was certainly an “innovation” and 
involved a different strategic direction that focused on a “concept-led” sales and marketing 
strategy. The conversation soon shifted to a discussion of the relationship between the UK 
office and US headquarters in general, and how working within an MNC might affect their 
strategic change initiative at subsidiary level. The team discussed how politically ‘risky’ their 
change initiative was. Not only could the highly ambitious short-term sales targets set by 
headquarters be adversely affected by their new brand repositioning strategy, it also deviated 
from established global policy, which demanded high volume sales at all costs, where retailers 
could ‘pick and choose’ stock and even knock down prices to secure high-volume agreements 
and where no ‘exclusivity’ agreements were permitted.  
We join the meeting in Extract 1 at this pivotal moment where the Marketing Manager 
(MM) provides his account of their position within the global organizational structure. A list 
of participants and other pseudonyms are provided in Table 2. 
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 ---- Insert Table 2 here ---- 
--- Insert Excerpt 1 here --- 
What is significant about this opening account is that MM “frames” (Fairhurst, 2010) 
the relationship between the US headquarters and UK subsidiary as one characterised by power 
and politics, in the form of power inequities and political conflict and tension. MM views their 
change initiative as constrained by the headquarters, which – in his view – has become more 
powerful and controlling over the last few years. The US headquarters, he states, are getting 
bigger and more powerful (L. 5-6), attempting to exert influence and control by sending staff 
to subsidiaries (L. 7-8), and constitute a force that is difficult to ‘fight against’ (L. 13-14). The 
use of terms such as ‘fight’ characterises the relationship in adversarial terms, which frames 
the headquarters as an ‘enemy’ of their own strategic plans. In short, MM introduced power 
and politics as categories relevant to the participants (members) themselves, which furnish the 
team with forms of practical reasoning about what kinds of barriers they may need to take into 
consideration in the parent-subsidiary relationship. His account acts as a kind of ‘warning tale’ 
to be careful about what obstacles may lie ahead.  
Through their accounts, stories and descriptions, “people descriptively construct events 
as following, or as departing from, some normative or expected order” (Edwards, 1997: 144). 
In terms of the ‘moral’ of the story, global headquarters are implicitly framed as the ‘bad guys’ 
who are likely to stand in the way of their attempts to do ‘good things’ at subsidiary level. The 
team, having already earlier framed their proposal as the ‘right’ thing to do to ‘rescue’ the 
business, position the headquarters as the adversary to be ‘fought’ and overcome: using a kind 
of ‘hero’ and ‘quest’ emplotment (Czarniawska, 2004: 21). By discursively enacting the 
relationship with global headquarters as one in which the latter is a ‘powerful adversary’ to 
their ‘good’ local initiatives, MM furnishes the team with a particular ‘logic’ for prospective 
sensemaking. Following this ‘logic’, the team are invited to think through whether, in light of 
their awareness of these powerful adversaries and political dangers, they should either (a) 
abandon their proposals because they anticipate it would be blocked by headquarters or be too 
foolhardy and dangerous to consider, or else (b) work ‘under the radar’ and attempt to 
implement their proposals ‘out of view’ of the parent headquarters.  
What did the team decide to do? At this point, perhaps anticipating these two options, 
MC interjects (line numbers are continuous) with a story of his own from his consultancy 
experience in another major Multinational corporation, a High Tech company ‘TechCo’: 
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--- Insert Excerpt 2 here --- 
MC tells a story of his experience at TechCo – a large multinational software firm – where the 
UK subsidiary did influence global strategy and ‘push back’ on the dictates of the headquarters. 
The metaphor of a ‘steamroller’ (L. 20) is used to frame the TechCo parent as a kind of crushing 
force that flattens all in its path. MC emphasises that the subsidiary did succeed in ‘stand(ing) 
in front of’ and ‘turning’ this ‘steamroller’ (L. 20-21) around – no doubt a difficult task given 
the association of steamrollers with being unidirectional and hard to turn. Here, a second set of 
warfare metaphors come into play: the team, MC advises, can succeed if they choose which 
‘battles’ to fight (L. 22) and ‘pick the winning ground’ (L. 23) and ‘stand their ground’ (L. 25). 
MC here attempts to ‘re-frame’ (Fairhurst, 2010) MM’s characterisation of the unequal power 
relationship between headquarters and subsidiary. Power relationships are not set in stone, he 
suggests, they can be changed, especially if they learn from his story about how TechCo’s 
headquarters started to listen to, and adopt, suggestions from its UK subsidiary (L. 26-30). 
However, perhaps recognising the need for ‘balance’ (L. 33, 34) in his consultancy 
advice to the team, MC balances his ‘success story’ with a kind of ‘warning tale’ (Zipes, 2012: 
39, 44) of the consequences of losing these ‘battles’: through reference to an existing story of 
the former Marketing Director (FMD) (L. 34). Here, an existing story – already well-known to 
the whole team – is repeated as a story ‘fragment’ (Boje, 1991) and it functions like the 
archetypical warning tale of Icarus (Booker, 2004: 154): become too confident and fly too close 
to the sun and you will perish. What is this story? A few months earlier, the former Marketing 
Director (FMD) had unexpectedly left the business. Speculation was rife about the cause of his 
sudden departure. FMD was known to have had a major ‘spat’ with global management over 
their marketing strategy and his attempts to challenge global policy – also repeated again here 
(L. 35-36). The fragmented gossip quickly settled into an established story that he had not left 
of his own volition (a potential “frame”), or been headhunted by a competitor (another potential 
“frame”), but had been “sacked” because of his political battle for control with the headquarters 
– meaning a political frame had been chosen to make sense of the event.  
The important point in our analysis is the motives and reasons contained within the 
story itself (Boje, 1991), which shape how this team made sense of it: namely, as an act of 
“political retaliation” for resisting global policy. We ask, what social and organizational actions 
does this story fragment perform (Boden, 1994) here? We suggest that it performs the act of 
sense censoring, whereby a story is told with the performative effect of making a considered 
course of action much less likely to be taken. In this case, it makes a subsidiary team, with their 
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own “sense” of the future strategy of the firm, likely to ‘censor’ their views when interacting 
with the global headquarters, for fear of suffering the same fate as FMD. It also serves to 
transform some of their planned strategic action – in this case the marketing innovation they 
are planning – into strategic inaction.  
Kristensen and Morgan (2006: 1478) remind us that ‘locally shared systems’ in MNCs 
exist “where people are narrating the biographies of individual managers and creating stories 
as to their performance.” Here, the story goes that the FMD picked a political fight with the 
Head Office, lost the battle, and retribution followed: lest we ‘learn this lesson’, this can (and 
will) happen again. The overall ‘lesson’ of MC’s two stories is thus: you should proceed to try 
to influence the practices of global headquarters, but you should proceed with caution, lest you 
end up losing your jobs too. Here, we see how discourse – in the form of accounts, stories and 
key metaphors – constructed their shared understandings and ‘enacted’ the structural 
relationship between parent and subsidiary in ways which informed their reasoning and shaped 
their proposals for action (Zbaracki, 1998). 
 How did the team react to MC’s ‘success story’ of the ‘battles’ won by TechCo, and 
his ‘warning tale’ of the political retaliation experienced by the former Marketing Director? 
MM then stepped back in (line numbers are continuous) to provide an account of his own 
experience of ‘fighting battles’ with the US headquarters: 
--- Insert Excerpt 3 here --- 
MM discursively enacts the nature of the parent-subsidiary relationship as one in which there 
exists a balance of power, something of a ‘tug of war’ ranging between headquarters dictating 
subsidiary policy and practice (“they will steamroller it”, L. 48-49), to the possibility of 
considerable scope for influence in the other direction (“we have significant influence” L. 47). 
MC then interjects with an addition to his previous story about TechCo (L. 55-69). In TechCo, 
he explains, the UK subsidiary gained additional power from forming an “alliance” with 
another regional head office to ‘fight the battle’ jointly (L. 57-63). Metaphors from politics, 
business and social movements are combined, with references to ‘alliances’ (L. 57) and 
‘rebellions’ (L. 57). This ‘update’ to the story of TechCo is not a trivial tale or piece of gossip 
but rather is crucial for their decision-making as a team. If, as MC acknowledges, the UK 
subsidiary of FitCo does not have other power-base (i.e. another subsidiary) it could form 
alliances with (“but in FitCo there aren’t bigger powerbases”, L. 68-69), then his ‘success story’ 
might not be easy for them to replicate. MM agrees: they cannot form an alliance with the other 
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largest regional office to fight the battle jointly, because that office is the global headquarters: 
and hence their only potential ‘ally’ is actually their ‘enemy’.  
Having been previously encouraged by MC to adopt a ‘fighting spirit’ and be ‘brave’ 
in their approach to global headquarters - copying the tactics from his experience as a 
consultant at TechCo - the team are now left with the original framing of the situation put 
forward by MM at the start of the conversation. Whilst Denning (2006: 43) discussed the notion 
of ‘springboard stories’, i.e. stories told in order to get people to do something, both the stories 
here end up doing precisely the opposite, encouraging the team to ‘say nothing’ (sense 
censoring) and ‘do nothing’ (strategic inaction) about certain issues.  
In the final exchange on the topic, MC seems to resign himself to agreeing with MM’s 
original formulation. Another set of metaphors – this time from the animal kingdom – are now 
invoked: MC states that the ‘elephant’ (read: headquarters) ‘standing on’ (read: 
dominating/imposing) ‘the ant’ (read: subsidiaries) is “the wrong thing to do” (L. 77), thereby 
framing headquarters’ domination of global subsidiary operations as an organizationally 
dysfunctional state of affairs. An overview of the analysis of these accounts, stories and 
metaphors is given in Table 3. 
 ---Insert Table 3 here --- 
What pattern of sensemaking did these various accounts, stories and metaphors 
produce? With MC’s ‘success story’ from TechCo looking unlikely to be replicated, and with 
their knowledge of the ‘dangers’ of losing these battles with headquarters from FMD’s 
experience, their pre-existing sensemaking patterns – as a relatively powerless and politically 
vulnerable subsidiary – were thereby reproduced and reinforced. The interviews conducted 
during the study (see Appendix) show that this “sense” arose from a widespread and deep-
rooted discourse shared by senior management within the UK subsidiary: part of their 
collective “sensemaking history” (Mantere, Schildt and Sillince, 2012). 
 
FROM DISCURSIVE ENACTMENT TO STRATEGIC INACTION AND SENSE-
CENSORING 
 
What happened next? Here we will trace seven key issues (Maitlis, 2005) over the months that 
followed which were informed by the now ‘settled’ and ‘sedimented’ framing of the parent-
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subsidiary relationship. The seven issues are ethnographically narrated below and are also 
presented visually as a timeline in Figure 1 and detailed further with reference to the empirical 
data sources in Table 4. Table 4 shows that in each case where a major event occurred or a 
major decision had to be made, the team used their established pattern of sensemaking – namely 
that headquarters represented a powerful source of opposition and political adversary to their 
change initiative – to inform their actions (or more precisely inactions). 
 
 --- Insert Figure 1 here --- 
 --- Insert Table 4 here --- 
 
Issue 1 
The project team had made a radical decision to “tell the truth” to the UK board about what 
they saw as the flawed strategic direction of the firm in the form of a one page document and 
presentation. However, while a document was sent to senior management, key parts which the 
team thought would be perceived as ‘blaming’ the global headquarters were deliberately 
omitted. They reasoned that it would be a ‘dangerous’ move to be openly critical of global 
policy. Hence, they engaged in sense-censoring by consciously censoring the information they 
presented to their superiors. To the subsidiary managers, this was not simply a self-interested 
move, designed to protect their own jobs, but it was also a cunning organizational move, 
designed to avoid unnecessary hurdles to their ‘good’ initiative.   
 
Issue 2 
The project team received news from HQ of the marketing budget for the UK launch of a new 
sub-brand called ‘Street Cool’. In their opinion, the budget was simply not enough to generate 
the sales demanded by the targets set by the global headquarters. Nonetheless, the team 
backtracked. There was no team request to the UK board to ask for increased budget to support 
the launch, despite their clear conviction that such additional resources were necessary. 
Sensemaking about power and politics thereby led to both sense-censoring (saying nothing) 
and strategic inaction (doing nothing).  
 
Issue 3 
The team was dismayed to learn of another increase in their sales targets set by the global 
headquarters. For them, pressure to sell ‘at any cost’ further denigrated the firm’s ability to 
gain long-term brand strength and ‘prestige’ status by forcing them into a short-term focus on 
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‘hitting the number’: that is, shifting stock in large volumes, often at knock-down prices 
through less prestigious ‘discount’ retailers. Whilst they were fiercely opposed to this short-
termism, and the targets themselves, the team “gave in” and didn’t pass on their concerns to 
the relevant UK board members – yet another instance of sense-censoring. The US HQ, they 
reasoned, were just ‘too powerful’ to challenge.  
 
Issue 4 
The US HQ announced the ‘Street Cool’ marketing campaign, designed by the US marketing 
department for the UK market. Staff from the UK office were invited to a special pre-launch 
screening of the new national television commercial in a local cinema. The reaction was a 
mixture of disbelief and disillusionment. Staff from the UK office viewed the advert as 
‘appalling’, even ‘laughable’: out of touch with the target niche market of British youth. The 
American sport and music “celebrities” featuring in the advert were not even recognisable to 
most British people. The advert was seen as a classic case of the pitfalls of centralization. In 
their view, marketing needed a more ‘decentralized’ and locally tailored approach. The second 
action researcher, also present at the screening, asked what they planned to do about their 
concerns. Puzzled faces responded that there was obviously ‘no point’ because any challenge 
to the global ‘diktat’ was futile. Their “sense” of the commercial as inappropriate for the local 
market was ‘censored’ and went no further. As a result, the advert went ahead and was screened 
across the UK. As predicted, the advert was widely regarded as a ‘flop’ and, worse still, 
potentially damaging to their brand image amongst the fashion-conscious youth market.  
 
Issue 5 
The US HQ announced a radical new global strategic plan to amalgamate the three existing 
sub-brands into one single ‘Street Cool’ brand. Unlike the other issues, this issue was not 
‘censored’ and did give rise to direct and vocal opposition by the project team, at subsidiary 
level at least. The team did attempt to “voice” their concerns to the UK Board, arguing that this 
proposal would damage their ability to appeal across vastly differing consumer segments of 
the UK market. Middle aged consumers wanting comfortable casual-wear, people looking for 
high-performance sportswear and teenagers who want to look trendy – these different markets 
could hardly be treated the same, could they? The centralised branding policy was, in their 
view, not responsive to the needs of the highly differentiated British market. The UK Board 
seemed to agree, but were not willing to deviate from global policy. So, rather than raise the 
issue and ‘fight’ the global headquarters directly, the team instead planned a ‘covert’ strategy 
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of secretly continuing their marketing around the original three brands.  They ‘feigned’ 
compliance and simply carried on with the original three sub-brands for a while, with the hope 
of convincing the UK Board to back their strategy and eventually challenge the US mandate.  
This was not a simple case of vested self-interest or protectionism. They felt 
passionately that they were “doing the right thing” for the firm as a whole. For example, in a 
small scale act of resistance (but ‘in secret’ to avoid detection), for the latest big sponsorship 
deal they refused to put the new “Street Cool” logo on the football shirts. This was not a self-
interested political rebellion but for business reasons: Street Cool was associated with (often 
violent) celebrity hip-hop rap stars, while football in the UK at the time was trying desperately 
to “clean up” its image and avoid associations with violence. Sense-censorship in this case led 
to local knowledge not being shared within the company and acts of resistance being hidden 
behind closed doors. Eventually, their resistance was ineffective anyway, as the UK Board 
gave in and they were forced to comply with global policy, further reinforcing their sense that 
“resistance is futile” and therefore in future they should “say nothing” (sense-censor) and “do 
nothing” (strategic inaction). 
 
Issue 6 
In response to this new global ‘single brand’ strategy, the project team developed a second 
brand strategy document, again to be presented to the UK Board. The team presented the UK 
Board with an ‘alternative vision’ for UK brand strategy, one which rejected the US plan. This 
initial plan was short lived. The Board seemed to agree, but did nothing. The project team made 
sense of this as a ‘climb-down’, with the dominant ‘discourse of fear’ of US reprisal, and the 
document was shelved. It went no further. The UK Board, they reasoned, were ‘puppets’ of the 
headquarters, ‘blindly’ following global diktats and unable to see the sense in taking a stand, 
perhaps out of fear of retaliation for ‘breaking ranks’. The team therefore decided not to carry 
on their ‘fight’ and the issue was dropped.  
 
Issue 7 
A recurrent issue in the parent-subsidiary relationship regarded who maintained control of the 
design of products for the UK market. Historically, footwear design - seen as the most 
important brand image driver - was managed centrally by the global headquarters. The team 
reasoned that their profitability (which was declining rapidly at this time) was damaged by 
what they saw as ‘irrelevant’ American products being ‘forced’ on them. British teenagers were 
generally not that interested in basketball or baseball stars, they argued. Despite continual pleas 
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by the Product Development Manager to his counterparts in the US for more decentralised 
product design, all were met with deaf ears and the status quo remained. This further reinforced 
the subsidiary’s beliefs that they should in future ‘censor’ their beliefs, ignore their local 
knowledge, forget local initiatives and simply comply with global diktats, even against their 
better judgement.   
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Our analysis of the discourse of subsidiary managers and an external management consultant 
during a pivotal early strategy meeting of a subsidiary-level change initiative has revealed the 
importance of discourse in ‘framing’ (Creed, Langstraat and Scully, 2002; Fiss and Hirsch, 
2005; Fairhurst, 2010) the subsidiary-headquarters relationship. The accounts produced during 
the meeting, in particular the framing effects of the metaphors used and the stories (re-)told, 
served first to establish, and then to sediment, ways of making sense of the subsidiary-
headquarters relationship. Metaphors play an active role in framing our understanding of the 
world (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), often in subconscious ways based on our embodied 
experiences (Cornelissen and Kafouros, 2008). Metaphors are also central to how we think of, 
in and about organizations (Morgan, 1986; Grant and Oswick, 1996). In this study, metaphors 
from the world of construction (‘steamroller’), warfare (‘battles’), and the animal kingdom 
(‘elephant’, ‘ant’) served to ‘frame’ the relationship between the subsidiary and parent. The 
parent headquarters, based in the US, was framed as a large, powerful and virtually unstoppable 
‘force’ that would ‘crush’ their attempts to enact strategic change at subsidiary level. The 
headquarters was also framed as a political ‘enemy’, which constituted the relationship as one 
of competition rather than cooperation. Interactions with the global headquarters were framed 
as a ‘battle’ rather than a ‘conversation’. Local knowledge of their market was framed as being 
‘steamrollered’ by global policy rather than ‘respected’. Subsidiary innovations were framed 
as being ‘stood on’ rather than ‘welcomed’. Animal metaphors – of a giant ‘elephant’ standing 
on a tiny ‘ant’ – conjured up metaphorical images of size to frame their subsidiary as 
“powerless”. Most importantly, this was not just idle chatter and gossip. The discursive 
enactment of these social facts resulted in certain actions not being taken, including actions 
that could be described as initiative-taking, innovation, and raising issues that would affect the 
long-term strategic success of the firm.  
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What our study shows is that the discursive enactment of power and politics was not 
‘just talk’, but rather, made practical and material differences to what happened within the 
MNC. On the basis of their enactment of the power and politics as social facts, the project team 
decided (a) to exclude certain pieces of information from their document of strategic diagnosis 
and recommendations to the U.K. Board, (b) not to request additional marketing resources 
relating to the launch of the StreetCool sub-brand, (c) not to question the sales targets they were 
given, (d) to avoid any visible criticism of the U.S.-designed advertising campaign, (e) to keep 
hidden any departures from the instructions given by Head Office relating to marketing 
strategy, and (f) to accept ‘defeat’ in their attempts to secure a U.K.-based product design team 
(see Table 4). Patterns of sensemaking led to patterns of (in)action, which reinforced these 
patterns of sensemaking and sedimented them further into the dominant discourse of the global 
headquarters – namely, as a powerful and political ‘force’ to be treated with scepticism, fear 
and caution. Significant organizational outcomes for the MNC arose from this process of 
discursive enactment, including information not being shared, issues being kept off the agenda, 
resources being allocated without full knowledge of their local consequences, and global 
decisions being made without adaptation to local contexts.  
Our study can also be seen as a failed attempt by an external change agent (MC) to 
‘frame break’ by challenging dominant patterns of sensemaking amongst the subsidiary 
managers. As Zbaracki (1998) and Weber and Glynn (2006: 1652) point out, “not all enacted 
realities stick”, and MC’s vision of renewed ‘bravery’ and ‘courage’ in ‘battling’ global 
headquarters certainly did appear to not ‘stick’ for long. What is crucial in terms of framing 
and sensemaking is that the assumptions about the power plays and lack of political support 
from the global headquarters discursively enacted by the team, and therefore treated as stable 
social facts, draw on pre-existing sensemaking patterns, a ‘sensemaking history’ (Mantere, 
Schildt and Sillince, 2012: 173). Moreover, this shared pattern of sensemaking pre-configures 
their actions. For example, without even having put forward their proposals to the global 
headquarters, the latter is already framed as a potential adversary and barrier to the local 
change initiative of the subsidiary.  
The construction of power and politics as ‘immutable facts’ means that proposals, 
issues and agendas do not even get ‘on the table’ (Lukes, 2005: 40), and can therefore not even 
receive a hearing. Power and politics were used to engage in prospective sensemaking to 
anticipate what might happen during events that have not yet happened (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 
1991; Gioia and Mehra, 1996; Gioia, Corley and Fabbri, 2002; Pitsis et al, 2003; Gephart, 
Topal and Zhang, 2010), in this case predicting the reactions of global headquarters to the 
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subsidiary change initiative they were planning. If we apply this theory to the ‘Toyota 
accelerator crisis’ case, we could argue that the Toyota American subsidiary deliberately 
suppressed its knowledge of the local context, and failed to provide the HQ with “appropriate 
information” regarding a potentially significant problem (Greto, Schotter & Teagarden, 
2010). This sense-censoring led to strategic inaction that allowed the crisis to mushroom and 
ultimately ended up costing the firm hundreds of millions of dollars and significant reputational 
damage. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper we have responded to Balogun et al.’s (2011) plea for research that illuminates 
how discursive methods can advance international business research (see also Vaara, 2002; 
Hardy et al, 2000; Vaara et al., 2006; Vaara and Tienari, 2008; Tienari and Vaara, 2011; 
Geppert, 2003). In particular, our study casts light on why subsidiaries behave the way they do. 
The discourse perspective we have developed in this paper fits with Dörrenbächer and 
Geppert’s (2006) call for a move away from rationalist, structuralist, deterministic and 
functionalist models of how organizations should structure and control their various SBUs 
towards perspectives which can address the question of “how key actors actually bring 
structures into play” (ibid. p. 262), in particular the structures associated with MNC politics 
(Clark and Geppert, 2011: 411). Specifically, we have analysed how subsidiary managers use 
“sensemaking to interpret each others’ political interests and stances” (Clark and Geppert, 
2011: 396). 
Balogun et al.’s (2011) study of subsidiary role evolution found that discourse was used 
to “sell” and “give voice” to certain understandings of a new charter, whereas other discourses 
encouraged forms of resistance to this new charter. Like in Balogun et al.’s (2011: 783) study, 
the subsidiary managers in our study “genuinely believed that there were differences in local 
market conditions” that would cause the global policy to fail. They also sought to create a new 
mandate and charter for their subsidiary and a higher degree of decentralization, where they 
would be given the right to develop their own local competencies, in areas such as marketing 
and product design (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). Whereas in 
Birkinshaw and Hood’s (1998) framework, subsidiaries can “see the opportunity to gain a new 
or enhanced charter” (p. 784), what our study shows is why subsidiaries may fail to develop 
the competencies or capabilities that they believe they hold. 
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Through the concept of sense-censoring, this paper develops an explanation of why 
certain “issues” felt by subsidiaries never get to the point of “issue selling” (Dutton et al., 2001; 
Ling et al., 2005), why new mandates and charters for subsidiaries are not developed 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005); why ideas emanating from 
subsidiaries never appear as forms of “voice” (Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008a; Balogun et al., 
2011), and why potential acts of “resistance” by subsidiaries (Clark and Geppert, 2011; 
Balogun et al., 2011) are quashed before they even emerge. In terms of the framework put 
forward by Mudambi (2011), this study shows that lying behind decisions about whether to 
‘acquiesce’ or ‘resist’ are types of subsidiary-level ‘reasoning procedures’ (Leiter, 1980) that 
explain why forms of resistance that could emerge actually fail to emerge. As a result, MNCs 
may be led to develop global products and policies without input from subsidiaries that are 
fearful of putting their “heads above the parapet”. MNCs may also fail to be aware of local 
initiatives and innovations, which are kept “under the radar”.  
Despite the fact that the subsidiary managers in our study thought their ideas and plans 
were both “legitimate and beneficial” (Balogun et al., 2011: 783) for the firm as a whole, not 
simply a case of self-interested protectionism or defence of turf, they still largely failed to voice 
their ideas (sense-censoring) and failed to act upon their plans (strategic inaction) because of 
the way they made sense of MNC power and politics. This is also despite the strategic position, 
economic performance and local embeddedness – not to mention the cultural history of the 
firm’s origins – that should theoretically have positioned them as a ‘high power’ subsidiary 
within the framework of Geppert and Williams (2006). As a result, knowledge flows and 
knowledge integration in MNCs (Madambi and Navarra, 2004; Becker-Ritterspach, 2006) are 
affected, as subsidiary managers fail to circulate their ‘locally embedded’ knowledge (Meyer 
et al., 2011). As such, we add to the understanding of the social systems that underpin 
knowledge integration developed by Becker-Ritterspach (2006) by revealing the patterns of 
sensemaking - created and reinforced through the sharing of accounts, stories and metaphors - 
upon which the local ‘contextual rationality’ (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 397) of knowledge 
sharing is founded. In particular, the potential of the marketing ‘innovation’ being developed 
by the project team in this study was never realised on a global scale due to the patterns of 
sense-censoring and strategic inaction we observed.  
Mudambi (2011) and Andersson et al. (2007) have both highlighted the parallel tensions 
that exist between efforts by headquarters to control their global operations, and the 
subsidiaries’ responses vis-à-vis such control efforts in the light of their local embeddedness. 
While we know that subsidiary responses can range from complete acquiescence and support 
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to outright hostility and rebellion (Schotter & Beamish, 2011), we do not know when or why 
forms of resistance fail to surface in the first place. Our contribution here is to show not only 
how subsidiaries make sense of why they should resist the mandates imposed by the global 
headquarters, but crucially why they decide not to act upon that sensemaking. In this study, 
forms of strategic action favoured by the subsidiary, such as requests for locally tailored 
marketing campaigns, bespoke product design and additional resources, were transformed into 
strategic inaction.  
The study therefore shows how the discursive enactment of power and politics as ‘social 
facts’ informed the “prospective preclusion of actions in taken-for-granted situations” (Weber 
and Glynn, 2006: 1651). The discourse of the subsidiary managers thereby served to “sustain 
and perpetuate particular meaning-systems and power arrangements” (Paroutis and 
Heracleous, 2013: 4), for instance by viewing voice and resistance as futile. The findings of 
the study also develop existing work which has highlighted the difficulties in ‘frame breaking’ 
and changing existing ways of sensemaking (Clark and Geppert, 2011). Given that global 
corporations typically expect, or even encourage, subsidiaries to share knowledge and propose 
innovations, sense-censoring has implications for the study of “perceptual discrepancies” in 
the global-local relationship (Clark and Geppert, 2011: 411). This paper therefore contributes 
by developing the understanding of the role of discourse in MNCs’ strategizing, sensemaking 
and sensegiving processes (Geppert, 2003; Maitlis, 2005), by viewing MNCs as “products of 
a continuous process of sensemaking, enactment and negotiated interactions” (Kostova et al., 
2008: 1002).  
Meyer et al. (2011: 236) have argued that understanding action in MNCs requires 
understanding the many different “interfaces” in which business units operate, as they are 
simultaneously embedded in the ‘external’ context of their local markets and networks and 
‘internally’ embedded in the MNC organization (also Yamin & Ghauri, 2010). In this study, 
the subsidiary in question chose to limit the extent to which their externally embedded 
knowledge of their local market, and preferred global strategy, was shared within the internal 
hierarchy of the MNC in a process of strategic inaction and sense-censoring. The key question 
we must ask is: why? Was this a case of subsidiary actors rationally recognizing the HQ’s 
position as legitimate in terms of ‘legal authority’ (Weber, 1978: 952, 1006; Mudambi, 2011)? 
Or is this a potential elaboration of social processes underlying Hymer’s ‘power retention’ 
thesis, such that “headquarters retain the power to structure the corporation in suitable ways to 
reduce its federative character” (Yamin & Forsgren, 2006: 174)? 
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Neither of these positions fully explains the findings of this study. We have shown that 
the subsidiary’s actions – or more precisely lack of actions - arose from the dominant 
understanding the managers held about their relatively weak bargaining power and relative 
vulnerability to political retaliation from the global headquarters. This dominant understanding, 
as we have shown, arose not only introspectively as a private cognitive process of sensemaking, 
but crucially also was produced and circulated socially and discursively in the form of accounts, 
stories and metaphors that served to create and reinforce the dominant patterns of sensemaking 
within the subsidiary. As such, our work here contributes to the growing body of work 
analysing power and politics as a “symbolic” and “discursive” phenomenon (Rouleau and 
Balogun, 2011). 
We also build on existing studies of the subsidiary-parent relationship (Dörrenbächer 
and Geppert, 2006; Taplin, 2006; Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard, 2006; Clark and Geppert, 
2011; Meyer et al., 2011; Mudambi, 2011; Rouleau and Balogun; 2011; Bousseba et al., 2012) 
by showing how actors create the social facts they rely on to undertake their reasoning about 
what is a ‘rational’ course of action to take: what Clark and Geppert (2011: 397) refer to as 
‘contextual rationalities’. This, we propose, enables us to explain why subsidiaries come to 
adopt certain courses of action, such as when to say nothing (sense-censoring) or do nothing 
(strategic inaction). Focusing on the role of discourse, we propose, enables us to get ‘behind 
the scenes’ to understand how the ‘facts’ about power and politics that actors rely upon to make 
decisions are produced socially in forms of talk and text. Future research could usefully be 
directed towards examining the role of sense-censoring in the ideological processes through 
which actors in MNCs, or affected by the actions of MNCs, become complicit in their own 
domination and subjugation (Willmott, 2013).  
  
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction 
 27 
REFERENCES 
Andersson, U., M. Forsgren and U. Holm (2007). Balancing subsidiary influence 
in the federative MNC: a business network view, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 38 (5), 802–18. 
Antaki, C. (1994). Explaining and arguing: The social organization of accounts. London: Sage. 
Balogun, J. and Johnson, G. (2004) Organizational restructuring and middle manager sensemaking. 
Academy of Management Journal, 47: 523–549. 
Balogun, J., and Johnson, G. (2005) From intended strategies to unintended outcomes: the impact of 
change recipient sensemaking, Organization Studies, vol 26, no. 11, pp. 1573-1601. 
Balogun, J., Jarzabkowski, P., and Vaara, E. 2011. Selling, resistance and reconciliation: A critical 
discursive approach to subsidiary role evolution in MNEs. Journal of International Business 
Studies, 42(6): 765-786  
Baunsgaard, V. V., and Clegg, S. (2013). ‘Walls or Boxes’: The Effects of Professional Identity, Power 
and Rationality on Strategies for Cross-Functional Integration. Organization Studies. 34(9): 
1299-1325. 
Becker-Rittespach, F. A. A. (2006). The social constitution of knowledge integration in MNEs: A 
theoretical framework. Journal of International Management. 12(3): 358–377. 
Becker-Ritterspach and Dörrenbächer (2011). An Organizational Politics Perspective on Intra-firm 
Competition in Multinational Corporations. Management International Review , 51(4): 533-
559. 
Birkinshaw, J., and Hood, N. (1998). Multinational subsidiary evolution: Capability and charter change 
in foreign-owned subsidiary companies. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 773-795. 
Birkinshaw, J., Holm, U., Thilenius, P., and Arvidsson, N. (2000). Consequences of perception gaps in 
the headquarters–subsidiary relationship. International Business Review, 9(3), 321-344. 
Blazejewski, S., and Becker-Ritterspach, F. (2011). Conflict in headquarters-subsidiary relations: a 
critical literature review and new directions. Politics and Power in the Multinational 
Corporation. The Role of Institutions, Interests and Identities, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 139-90. 
Boden, D. (1994). The business of talk: organizations in action. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Boje, D. M. (1991). The storytelling organization: A study of story performance in an office-supply 
firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 106–126. 
Bolander, P. and Sandberg, J. (2013). How employee selection decisions are made in 
practice. Organization Studies, 34(3): 285-311. 
Booker, C. (2004). The seven basic plots: Why we tell stories. Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Bouquet, C., and Birkinshaw, J. (2008a). Weight versus voice: How foreign subsidiaries gain attention 
from corporate headquarters. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3), 577-601. 
Bouquet, C., and Birkinshaw, J. (2008b) Managing power in the multinational corporation: How low-
power actors gain influence. Journal of Management, 34(3): 477–508. 
Boussebaa, M., Morgan, G. and Sturdy, A. (2012). Constructing global firms? National, transnational 
and neocolonial effects in international management consultancies. Organization Studies, 33 
(4): 465-486. 
Buchanan, D.A. and Badham, R. (1999). Power, Politics and Organisational Change: Winning the Turf 
game. London: Sage. 
Butcher, D. and Clarke, M. (2003). Redefining managerial work: smart politics, Management Decision, 
41(5): 477 – 487. 
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction 
 28 
Cantwell, J., and Mudambi, R. (2005). MNE competence-creating subsidiary mandates. Strategic 
Management Journal, 26(12): 1109-1128. 
Chini, T., Ambos, B., and Wehle, K. (2005). The headquarters-subsidiaries trench: Tracing perception 
gaps within the multinational corporation. European Management Journal, 23(2), 145–153. 
Clark, E., and Geppert, M. (2011). Subsidiary integration as identity construction and institution 
building: a political sensemaking approach. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2), 395-416. 
Cornelissen J.P. and Kafouros M.I. (2008). The Emergent Organization: Primary and Complex 
Metaphors in Theorizing about Organizations, Organization Studies, 29(7): 957–978.  
Creed, W. D., Langstraat, J. A., and Scully, M. A. (2002). A picture of the frame: Frame analysis as 
technique and as politics. Organizational Research Methods, 5(1), 34-55.  
Czarniawska, B. (2004). Narratives in social science research. Sage. 
Denning, S. (2006). Effective storytelling: strategic business narrative techniques. Strategy and 
Leadership, 34(1): 42-48. 
Dörrenbächer, C., and Gammelgaard, J. (2011). Conflicts in Headquarters-subsidiary Relationships: 
Headquarters-driven Charter Losses in Foreign Subsidiaries. In: Dörrenbächer, C., and 
Geppert, M. (Eds.). (2011). Politics and power in the multinational corporation: The role of 
institutions, interests and identities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 231-254.  
Dörrenbächer, C., and Geppert, M. (2006). Micro-politics and conflicts in multinational corporations: 
Current debates, re-framing, and contributions of this special issue. Journal of International 
Management, 12(3), 251-265. 
Doz, Y. and C.K. Prahalad (1984). Patterns of strategic control Within MNCs, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 15(2), 55-72.  
Dutton, J. E., Ashford, S. J., O'Neill, R. M., and Lawrence, K. A. (2001). Moves that matter: Issue 
selling and organizational change. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 716-736. 
Edwards, D (1997). Discourse and Cognition. London: Sage. 
Edwards, D., and Potter, J. (1992). Discursive Psychology (Vol. 8). London: Sage. 
Edwards, P., and Bélanger, J. (2009). The multinational firm as a contested terrain. In D Collinson and 
G Morgan (Eds) The Multinational Firm, Chichester, Wiley-Blackwell, 193-216. 
Fairhurst, G. T. (2010). The power of framing: Creating the language of leadership (Vol. 290). New 
York: Jossey-Bass. 
Ferner, A. (2000) The underpinnings of ‘‘bureaucratic’’ control systems: HRM in European 
multinationals, Journal of Management Studies 37(4): 521–539.  
Ferner, A. and Edwards, P. (1995) Power and the diffusion of organizational change within 
multinational enterprises, European Journal of Industrial Relations 1(2): 229–257. 
Fiss, P. C., and Hirsch, P. M. (2005). The discourse of globalization: Framing and sensemaking of an 
emerging concept. American Sociological Review, 70(1), 29-52. 
Gephart, R. P. (1978) Status degradation and organizational succession: An ethno- methodological 
approach. Administrative Science Quarterly, 23(4): 553– 581 
Gephart, R. P., Topal, C., and Zhang, Z. (2010). Future-oriented sensemaking: Temporalities and 
institutional legitimation. In T. Hernes, and S. Maitlis (Eds.), Process, sensemaking, and 
organizing (pp. 275–311). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Geppert, M. (2003). Sensemaking and politics in MNCs: a comparative analysis of vocabularies within 
the global manufacturing discourse in one industrial sector. Journal of Management Inquiry, 
12(4), 312-329. 
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction 
 29 
Geppert, M., and Williams, K. (2006). Global, national and local practices in multinational 
corporations: Towards a socio-political framework. International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 17(1): 49–69. 
Geppert, M., and Dörrenbächer, C. (2011). Politics and power in the multinational corporation: An 
introduction. Politics and Power in the Multinational Corporation: The Role of Institutions, 
Interests and Identities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-38. 
Ghoshal, S., and Westney, D. E. (Eds.). (2003). Organization theory and the multinational corporation. 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gioia, D. A., and K. Chittipeddi (1991) Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change initiation. 
Strategic Management Journal 12: 433–448.  
Gioia, D. A., and A. Mehra (1996) Review of Sensemaking in organizations. Academy of Management 
Review 21: 1226–1230.  
Gioia, D. A., K. G. Corley, and T. M. Fabbri. (2002) Revising the past (while thinking in the future 
perfect tense). Journal of Organizational Change Management 15: 622–634. 
Goffman, E. (1959/71). The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth: Pelican Books 
Grant, D., and Oswick, C. (eds.) (1996) Metaphor and organizations. London: Sage. 
Greto, M., Schotter, A. and Teagarden, M. (2010). Toyota: The Accelerator Crisis, Thunderbird School 
of Global Management. Case No: A09-10-0011. 
Gunn, J., and Chen, S. (2006) A micro-political perspective of strategic management. in E. Vigoda-
Gadot and A. Drory (Eds.), Handbook of organizational politics, Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, pp. 209-229. 
Hardy, C., and Clegg, S. R. (1996). Some dare call it power. Handbook of organization studies, 622-
641. 
Hardy, C., Palmer, I., and Phillips, N. (2000) Discourse as a strategic resource. Human Relations, 53(9), 
1227-1247. 
Hughes, J., D. Randall, M. Rouncefield and P. Tolmie (2012) Meetings and the Accomplishment of 
Organization. In: Rouncefield, M. and Tolmie, P. (eds) Ethnomethodology at Work. London: 
Ashgate. 
Hymer, S. H. (1979). The multinational corporation: a radical approach. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Jarzabkowski, P. and Balogun, J. (2009) The practice and process of delivering integration through 
strategic planning. Journal of Management Studies, 46.8: 1255-1288. 
Jarzabkowski, P. and Wilson, D. C. (2002), Top Teams and Strategy in a UK University. Journal of 
Management Studies, 39: 355–381. 
Kacmar, K.M., Bozeman, D.P., Carlson, D.S., and Anthony, W.P. (1999). An examination of the 
perceptions of organizational politics model: Replication and extension. Human Relations, 52, 
383-416. 
Kostova, T., Roth, K., and Dacin, M. T. (2008). Institutional theory in the study of multinational 
corporations: A critique and new directions. Academy of Management Review, 33(4), 994-1006. 
Krause-Jensen, J. (2010). Flexible Firm. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books. 
Kristensen, P. H., and Zeitlin, J. (2005). Local players in global games: The strategic constitution of a 
multinational corporation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kristensen and Morgan (2006). The contested space of multinationals: Varieties of institutionalism, 
varieties of capitalism. Human Relations: 59(11), 1467-1490. 
Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson (1980) Metaphors We Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction 
 30 
Leiter, K. (1980) A Primer on Ethnomethodology, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Ling, Y., Floyd, S., and Baldridge, D. (2005). Toward a model of issue selling by subsidiary managers 
in multinational organizations. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(6), 637–654. 
Llewellyn, N. and Spence, L. (2009) Practice as a Members' Phenomenon, Organization Studies, 
30(12): 1419-1439. 
Lukes, S (2005). Power: A radical view. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Maitlis, S. (2005). The Social Processes of Organizational Sensemaking, Academy of Management 
Journal 48(1): 21-49. 
Maitlis, S. and Lawrence, T. (2003) Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark: Understanding Failure in 
Organizational Strategizing. Journal of Management Studies. 40(1): 109-139. 
Maitlis, S. and Lawrence, T. (2007) Triggers and Enablers of Sensegiving in Organizations, Academy 
of Management Journal 50(1): 57-84. 
Maitlis, S., and Christianson, M. (2014). Sensemaking in organizations: Taking stock and moving 
forward. The Academy of Management Annals, 8(1), 57-125.  
Mantere, S., Schildt, H. A., and Sillince, J. A. (2012). Reversal of strategic change. Academy of 
Management Journal, 55(1): 172-196.  
Mazzarella, W. (2006) Shoveling Smoke. Durham and London: Duke University Press 
Meyer, K. E., Mudambi, R., and Narula, R. (2011). Multinational enterprises and local contexts: the 
opportunities and challenges of multiple embeddedness. Journal of Management Studies, 48(2), 
235-252.  
Moeran, B. (2009) From Participant Observation to Observant Participation. in S Ybema, D Yanow, H 
Wels and F Kamsteeg (eds), Organizational Ethnography: Studying the Complexities of 
Everyday Life, London: Sage, 139-155. 
Moerman, M. (1988). Talking culture: Ethnography and conversation analysis. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press.   
Monin, P., Noorderhaven, N., Vaara, E., and Kroon, D. (2013). Giving sense to and making sense of 
justice in a post merger integration. Academy of Management Journal, 56(1): 256-284 
Morgan, G (1986) Images of Organization, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
Morgan, G. (2001). The multinational firm: organizing across institutional and national divides. In: 
Morgan, G., Kristensen, P. H., and Whitley, R. (Eds.). (2001). The multinational firm: 
organizing across institutional and national divides. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-26. 
Mudambi, R. (2011). Hierarchy, coordination, and innovation in the multinational enterprise. Global 
Strategy Journal, 1(3-4), 317-323.  
Mudambi, R., and Navarra, P. (2004). Is knowledge power? Knowledge flows, subsidiary power and 
rent-seeking within MNCs. Journal of International Business Studies, 35(5): 385-406.  
Mueller, F. (1996). National stakeholders in the global contest for corporate investment. European 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 2(3), 345-368. 
Paroutis, S., and Heracleous, L. (2013). Discourse revisited: Dimensions and employment of first‐order 
strategy discourse during institutional adoption. Strategic Management Journal, 28(4): 459-
473. 
Pettigrew, A. M., Woodman, R. W. and Cameron, K. S. (2001). Studying Organizational Change and 
Development: Challenges for Future Research. Academy of Management Journal 44(4), 697-
713. 
Pfeffer, J. (2010). Power: Why Some People Have It - And Others Don't. New York: HarperCollins. 
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction 
 31 
Pitsis T., Clegg S., Marosszeky M., and Rura-Polley T. (2003) Constructing the Olympic Dream: A 
Future Perfect Strategy of Project Management. Organization Science, 14(5): 574-590. 
Potter, J. (1996) Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction. London: Sage. 
Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and social psychology: Beyond attitudes and behaviour. 
London: Sage. 
Prahalad, C.K. and Y. Doz, (1981) An Approach to Strategic Control in Multinational Companies, 
Sloan Management Review, 22(4): 5-13. 
Rouleau, L. and Balogun, J. (2011) Middle Managers, Strategic Sensemaking and Discursive 
Competence, Journal of Management Studies, vol 48, no. 5, pp. 953-983. 
Rugman, A. M. (2005) The regional multinationals: MNEs and 'global' strategic management. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Samra-Fredericks, D. (2003) Strategizing as lived experience and strategists' everyday efforts to shape 
strategic direction. Journal of Management Studies. 40(1): 141-174. 
Sandberg, J and Tsoukas, H (2011) Grasping the Logic of Practice: Theorizing Through Practical 
Rationality. Academy of Management Review 36(2), 338-360. 
Schotter, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2011). Performance effects of MNC headquarters–subsidiary conflict 
and the role of boundary spanners: The case of headquarter initiative rejection. Journal of 
International Management, 17(3), 243-259. 
Suddaby R, Foster WM, and Trank CQ. (2010) Rhetorical history as a source of competitive 
advantage. In: Baum Joel A.C., Joseph Lampel, ed. The Globalization of Strategy Research. 
Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.147-173. 
Taplin, I. (2006) Strategic change and organisational restructuring: How managers negotiate change 
initiatives. Journal of International Management, 12(3): 284-301.  
Thomas, W. I. (2002) "The Definition of the Situation," in Self, Symbols, and Society: Classic Readings 
in Social Psychology, Nathan Rousseau (ed), Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 103-
115. 
Tienari, J. and Vaara, E. (2011) On the Narrative Construction of Multinational Corporations: An 
Antenarrative Analysis of Legitimation and Resistance in a Cross-Border Merger. Organization 
Science, 22(2): 370-90 
Vaara, E. (2002) On the discursive construction of success/failure in narratives of post-merger 
integration. Organization Studies, 23(2): 211-248. 
Vaara, E. and Tienari, J. (2008) A discursive perspective on legitimation strategies in MNCs. Academy 
of Management Review, 33(4): 985-993  
Vaara, E., Tienari, J., and Laurila, J. (2006) Pulp and paper fiction: On the discursive legitimation of 
global industrial restructuring. Organization Studies, 27(6): 789-813. 
Vaara, E., and Monin, P. (2010) A recursive perspective on discursive legitimation and organizational 
action in mergers and acquisitions. Organization Science, 21(10): 3-22.  
Weber K. and Glynn, M. A. (2006) Making Sense with Institutions: Context, Thought and Action in 
Karl Weick’s Theory. Organization Studies. 27(11):  1639-1660. 
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society. Two Volume Set, with a New Foreword by Guenther Roth 
(Editor), and Claus Wittich (Editor). Univ of California Press. 
Whittle A, Housley W, Gilchrist A, Mueller F. & Lenney P, 2014. Power, Politics and Organizational 
Communication: An Ethnomethodological Perspective. In: François Cooren, Eero Vaara, Ann 
Langley and Haridimos Tsoukas, ed. Language and Communication at Work: Discourse, 
Narrativity, and Organizing. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 71-94. 
Sensemaking, Sense-censoring and Strategic Inaction 
 32 
Williams, C. (2011) Subsidiary manager socio-political interaction: the impact of host country 
culture. In: Dörrenbächer, C., and Geppert, M. (Eds.). Politics and Power in the Multinational 
Corporation: The Role of Institutions, Interests and Identities, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 283-314. 
Willmott, H. (2013) Reflections on the Darker Side of Conventional Power Analytics. The Academy of 
Management Perspectives, 27(4), 281-286. 
Wright, S. (1994) ‘Culture’ in anthropology and organizational studies, in: Wright, S. (ed) (1994) 
Anthropology of Organizations, London: Routledge, 1-31. 
Yamin M and Ghauri P (2010)‘A critical assessment of the business network perspective on HQ control 
in multinational companies’ in Andersson, U. and Holm, U. (eds.) Managing the Contemporary 
Multinational Corporation. Edward Elgar, pp. 125-137 
Yamin, M. and Forsgren, M. (2006) ‘Hymer’s analysis of the multinational organization: power 
retention and the demise of the federative MNE’ International Business Review, 15(2), 166-
179. 
Zbaracki, M. J. (1998) The rhetoric and reality of total quality management. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 43(3): 602-636.  
Zipes, J. (2012) Fairy tales and the art of subversion. London: Routledge. 
 
 
 
 
